The space between us: embodiment and intersubjectivity in Watsuji and Levinas by Krueger, Joel
53
FOUR
The Space between Us
EMBODIMENT AND INTERSUBJECTIVITY IN WATSUJI AND LEVINAS
Joel Krueger
This essay brings Emmanuel Levinas and Watsuji Tetsurō into con-
structive philosophical engagement. Rather than focusing primarily on 
interpretation — admittedly an important dimension of comparative 
philosophical inquiry — my intention is to put their respective views 
to work, in tandem, and address the problem of the embodied social 
self.1 Both Watsuji and Levinas share important commonalities with 
respect to the embodied nature of intersubjectivity —  commonalities 
that, moreover, put both thinkers in step with some of the concerns 
driving current treatments of social cognition in philosophy and cog-
nitive science. They can make a fruitful contribution to this discussion 
by lending a phenomenologically informed critical perspective. Each 
in their own way challenges the internalist and cognitivist presupposi-
tions informing the currently dominant “Theory of Mind” paradigm 
driving much social cognition research. Moreover, their respective 
views receive empirical support from a number of different sources.
I. WHY WATSUJI AND LEVINAS?
Both Watsuji and Levinas share several common philosophical pre-
occupations that make them productive conversation partners.2 For 
example, both continually argue for ethics as first philosophy. Watsuji’s 
most important book, Rinrigaku (倫理学, A Study of Ethics), is a 
three-volume work in which he argues at length that, as first philoso-
phy, ethical inquiry is logically prior to both humanistic and scientific 
inquiry.3 Similarly, Levinas insists on the philosophical “primacy of 
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the ethical, that is, of the relationship of man to man . . . primacy of an 
irreducible structure upon which all other structures rest” (TI 79).
Moreover, both Watsuji and Levinas conceive of ethical inquiry 
as a phenomenologically oriented inquiry into the nature of ethical 
agency. Neither was concerned with formulating abstract principles 
divorced from the flux and flow of situated moral life; and nei-
ther offers an ethical system in the traditional, philosophical sense 
(i.e., virtue, utilitarian, or deontological). Rather, both are criti-
cal of such approaches for how they abstract from everyday life and 
unfairly posit the disembodied and isolated ego as the primary unit 
of analysis. As a result, Watsuji and Levinas instead concern them-
selves with exploring how ethical practice is enacted within concrete 
human relationships.4 They assume a firmly situated approach to ethi-
cal inquiry — that is, an approach that urges the primacy of action and 
of our embodied and affectively charged, face-to-face encounter with 
the other. For instance, Watsuji writes at the beginning of Rinrigaku 
that any ethical consideration “which abstracts away from the practi-
cal connections between person and person” is inadequate in that it 
overlooks the intercorporeal basis of ethical agency.5 Levinas likewise 
urges that ethics is fundamentally a responsive and relational phe-
nomenon that arises in the fundamental encounter with the face of 
another.
Finally, given this staunchly embodied and situated approach 
to ethical inquiry, both Watsuji and Levinas develop original and 
highly creative phenomenological analyses in their respective efforts 
to unpack the nature of our sociality. For Watsuji, this entails an 
extended consideration of the experiential structure of social space: 
the interpersonal “betweenness” (aidagara, 間柄) that couples self 
and other in a dialectical relation of activity and passivity. Likewise, 
Levinas expends considerable attention explicating the basic struc-
tures of what he terms “lived affectivity” (sensibility, fraternity, and 
proximity) in addition to extended treatments of bodily and affec-
tive phenomena (pleasure, anticipation, fatigue, nausea, indolence, 
insomnia, sexuality, parenthood, and the simple joy of eating) in 
order to better understand the subtle layers of feeling and engage-
ment that bind the self to a shared world.
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In sum, both Watsuji and Levinas work out a phenomenologically 
motivated ethics beginning with a careful consideration of the lived 
body in relation to others. Additionally, both thinkers are united in 
the claim that the lived encounter with otherness is a constitutive part 
of the development of the self and subjectivity. Despite these similari-
ties, there are some important differences between them, which will 
be discussed as we progress. Ultimately, however, my emphasis is on 
their fruitful points of contact and contemporary relevance.
II. WATSUJI ON EMBODIED INTERSUBJECTIVITY
One of Watsuji’s most important contributions is his repeated 
insistence that “human relationships are, in truth, the relationships of 
our carnal interconnections in space.”6 The body and space together 
form the origin and center of Watsuji’s ethics. Moreover, he repeat-
edly emphasizes the way that our agency provides the principle of 
coordination establishing the mutuality of our relationships within 
shared social space. Watsuji insists that the human relations he is con-
cerned with “are not objective relations established through subjec-
tive unity, as is the case with spatial relations between subject and 
object. Rather, they are act-connections between person and person 
like communication or association.”7 For it is within these dynamic 
act-connections that ethics becomes concretized, embodied within 
various forms of ethical praxis that allow us to manage and negoti-
ate human relationships. Watsuji therefore concludes, “The locus of 
ethical problems lies not in the consciousness of the isolated individ-
ual, but precisely in the in-betweenness of person and person.”8 This 
“in-betweenness” (aidagara) or lived social space, as the space of 
action, thus has an intrinsic qualitative character that differentiates it 
from geometrical space. Spelling out this character of social space — as 
well as the body that inhabits and negotiates it — occupies the bulk of 
Watsuji’s phenomenological analysis.9
The body, Watsuji acknowledges, is “an organism of the sort that 
physiology expounds.”10 As such, the physical body is our point of 
contact with the world. It is what allows us to interact with the world, 
to do things in it and to it — and at the same time to be causally 
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effected by various things that the world does to us.11 But the body is 
also more than a “mere physiological object.”12 The body is addition-
ally, and coequally, a subjective body: a lived, first-person perspective 
on the world. The body thus has an irreducibly “dual structure,” 
according to Watsuji.13 It is simultaneously an object as well as an 
experiential dimension, a bodily subjectivity.14 What this means is 
that the lived body is not strictly speaking a content of consciousness, 
such as the visual perception of a tree or the memory of a child-
hood experience. Rather, the lived body is our anchored first-person 
perspective on the world — the anchored perspective that grounds 
our egocentric frame of spatial reference by which we are disclosed 
to ourselves as bodily subjects situated in the world.15 And what is 
perhaps most philosophically intriguing is that the body simultane-
ously realizes both of these modalities; it is hybrid. As Watsuji puts 
it, “Whether considered theoretically or practically, a human body 
is subjective through and through, so long as it is an element in the 
activity of a subject.”16 But there is yet another irreducible dimension 
of embodiment that requires further elucidation: the sociality of the 
body. He appeals to interpersonal interactions and offers several vivid 
phenomenological descriptions to make his point.
Watsuji begins by noting that within interpersonal contexts the 
body of another is never encountered as pure object (i.e., as a “bio-
logical organism” or “mere material solid”). In a passage worth quot-
ing at length, he asks:
Is it true to say, when we meet a friend and exchange greetings, that 
we take for granted that the greeting of our partner is a movement of 
a physiological body? Is it true to say, on seeing my friend run toward 
me while calling my name, that I pay attention only to such things as 
the vehement movement of muscle and the vibration of vocal chords? 
Everyone knows that this is not the case. In the movements of the 
human body, that is, in its behavior, we catch a glimpse of the expres-
sion of an acting subject, rather than the mere object of physiology. 
Here, in the way in which a human body exists in daily life, we see 
not so much a physiological process as expressions of certain practical 
act-connections. Whether the person whom I asked to help me attain 
a job says “yes” or “no” by shaking her head vertically or horizontally 
is nonsense from a purely physiological standpoint, but it is of great 
 practical significance. Through such practical act-connections, the 
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human body is viewed, as it were, as an individual “person” and not as 
a mere biological organism.17
When we encounter another bodily subject, when we encounter 
a friend standing beside a bronze statue, for instance, we do not 
encounter our friend as a material solid having the same form as the 
statue but instead greet and emotionally engage with our friend as 
a dynamic expression of bodily subjectivity. In other words, Watsuji 
writes, “It is not that I first touch her hand as a material solid and 
afterwards come to infer that this material solid is put into motion 
by my friend’s mind. Rather, from the outset, I touch my friend 
herself.”18 The physical body is therefore an expressive vehicle that 
externalizes, via “practical act-connections,” aspects of another’s sub-
jectivity in such a way that I have immediate perceptual and emo-
tional access to them. Though other aspects of their subjectivity 
remain transcendent — the first-person perspective entails a certain 
exclusivity or privileged access, in that I can think and feel things that 
no one else need know about — it is nevertheless the case that the 
body, as an expressive vehicle, makes manifest other aspects of sub-
jectivity within the in-betweenness of social interaction. The physi-
ological body, simultaneously a bodily subjectivity, is therefore always 
saturated with expressive significance.
Vivid descriptions aside, what sort of argument does Watsuji 
give to support this claim about the bodily basis of intersubjectiv-
ity? To begin with, it seems that Watsuji is here endorsing what has 
recently been termed a “direct perception” view of social  cognition.19 
According to this view, the basis of interpersonal understanding 
consists in empathic perception. Distinct from sympathy — which 
involves a care or concern for others, such as the inclination to com-
fort parents grieving over the loss of a child — empathic perception is 
rather a more fundamental, indeed the fundamental, mode of access 
to another person as a person. Prior to cultivating sympathetic feel-
ings of concern for another, we must first experience them as a sub-
ject, that is, we must perceive them as minded. Empathy is therefore 
a basic, irreducible mode of perceptual (i.e., intentional) directedness 
toward another’s subjectivity.20 Importantly, it does not entail that 
one necessarily feel precisely what one perceives another is feeling 
(e.g., I can directly  perceive another’s grief at losing a child even if I 
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don’t, in that moment, feel grief of a similar character or intensity). In 
empathic perception, the other’s feeling remains transcendent in this 
sense, however immediately I am able to recognize it. Nevertheless, 
what is relevant to this discussion is that the thoughts and emo-
tions of others are directly, which is to say perceptually, accessible. 
There is thus no need to posit an intellectual process or mechanism 
that mediates my experience of another’s subjectivity. Rather, it is 
directly perceivable within the experiential immediacy of empathic 
perception. For it is here, Watsuji argues, that we experience “bodies 
viewed as expressions of the subjective or as persons in their concrete 
 qualities.”21
What justifies Watsuji’s direct perception view of social cogni-
tion? His main argument leans heavily on the analysis of the German 
phenomenologist Max Scheler.22 And like Scheler, there seem to be 
two core aspects to Watsuji’s argument: (1) the rejection of ana-
logical inference as our primary means of understanding others, and 
(2) a rejection of the internalist view of the mind as an entity wholly 
realized within the head. Together, Watsuji challenges head-on the 
notion that we never have direct access to the mind of another and 
insists, to the contrary, that we in fact do. Thinking of subjectivity as 
(at least partially) externalized within the practical act-connections of 
social interaction thus eliminates the need to posit a mediating mech-
anism of any sort. And the positive contribution of this view, Watsuji 
argues, is that by questioning the primacy of a sharp inner versus 
outer distinction, we are in a better position to develop a “correct 
understanding of the human body”: the human body formulated as 
a subjective body, that is, the expressive vehicle externalizing aspects 
of our inner life.23
First, Watsuji rejects the idea that some variety of analogical infer-
ence forms the basis for interpersonal understanding.24 According to 
this view, we first perceive the body and expressive behavior as move-
ments of a “biological body” or “mere material solid.” In this view, 
we perceive “such things as the vehement movement of muscle and 
the vibration of vocal chords” and, in a stepwise process, second-
arily infer the existence of some sort of subjectivity behind them.25 
Our inference here is warranted, this view further holds, because we 
 recognize these observed movements as motor possibilities for us, 
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that is, movements we, too, can make and which are causally moti-
vated by our own subjective states. Thus, I infer (as a sort of inference 
to the best explanation, since I cannot actually experience another’s 
subjectivity, the line of argument continues) that there is a similar 
subjectivity “behind” another’s expressive behavior, providing both 
its causal origin and communicative intention. But again, I can never 
be certain of another’s subjective life, only their publically observable 
behavior, since minds are, in principle, localized in the head and thus 
given with an irreducible first-person privilege.
Some variation of this argument from analogy motivates much of 
the debate within the “Theory of Mind” framework in current social 
cognition.26 According to this framework, social cognition is funda-
mentally a kind of “mind reading” facilitated by one of two mediating 
mechanisms: the predictive theories of Theory Theory (TT) or the 
simulative models of Simulation Theory (ST).27 Though they differ 
in their details, both TT and ST rest on the “Myth of the Hidden”: 
the assumption that mental states are, in principle, hidden inside 
individual skulls, and therefore, that we can only ever attain indi-
rect knowledge of other’s thoughts and feelings by first  perceiving 
external behavior and then inferring to inner states via theorization, 
simulation, or some combination of the two.28
On the face of it, this view seems to square with common sense. 
Where else could minds be if not in the head? But both Watsuji 
and Scheler offer several reasons why this view is problematic. 
Scheler points out that the analogy-based view of social cognition 
is  circular.29 He notes that we are conscious of our own movements 
from the inside, as it were, “as intentions to move” discharged in dif-
ferent forms of expressive behavior.30 But the movements of others 
are experientially given in a different mode of presentation: namely, 
they are “represented by the visual image of such movements” given 
from an external observational standpoint.31 Thus, there is “no sort of 
immediate resemblance or similarity to the data encountered in our 
own case,” and any inference to the contrary is unwarranted.32 And 
yet we do experientially encounter others as minded; furthermore, 
at times we do employ analogical reasoning to sort out what it is 
we think they are up to. But in these cases, Scheler insists, we only 
do so once we have already taken another’s inner life for granted. 
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Analogical  inference cannot be our basic means of understanding 
others but instead requires a more immediate form of interpersonal 
connection.
Likewise, Watsuji insists that the observational stance necessary for 
analogical inference is a derived form of interpersonal relatedness — for, 
“to deal with a human being as a mere physiological object, we must 
deprive her of various other qualifications in order to construct an 
abstract framework of understanding.”33 But he argues further, “This 
distinctive way of looking at things arises only within a position in 
which the practical attitude has become completely eliminated and 
thus not in accordance with actual everyday reality.”34 Within the 
in-betweenness of our face-to-face interactions, the other is, to the 
contrary, always already encountered as an expressive unity, a bodily 
subjectivity.35 Analogical inference in social contexts is thus a derived 
form of understanding based on a more primitive connectedness.
Both Scheler and Watsuji further reject that assumption lurking 
behind the analogical inference model of empathy: namely, the inter-
nalist model of mind according to which the subjectivity of another is 
wholly realized inside the head, hidden to everyone but the subject. 
This is, perhaps, the most philosophically radical aspect of their respec-
tive views. Scheler speaks of the “expressive unity” (Ausdruckseinheit) 
of the embodied mind and of interpersonal engagements as “pat-
terns of wholeness” in which aspects of another’s inner life are given 
directly and noninferentially.36 In his most well-known statement of 
the view, he writes:
For we certainly believe ourselves to be directly acquainted with another 
person’s joy in his laughter, with his sorry and pain in his tears, with his 
shame in his blushing, with his entreaty in his outstretched hands, with 
his love in his look of affection, with his rage in the gnashing of teeth, 
with his threats in the clenching of his fist, and with the tenor of his 
thoughts in the sound of his words. If anyone tells me that this is not 
“perception,” for it cannot be so, in view of the fact that a perception 
is simply a “complex of physical sensations,” and that there is certainly 
no sensation of another person’s mind nor any stimulus from such a 
source, I would beg him to turn aside from such questionable theories 
and address himself to the phenomenological facts.37
According to Scheler, expressive movements such as facial expressions 
and gestures give us direct and immediate perceptual access to the 
53-78_KALMANSON ET AL_F6.indd   60 8/23/2013   7:11:59 PM
© 
20
13
 D
uq
ue
ne
 U
niv
ers
ty 
Pr
es
s
The Space between Us 61
mind of another. This is because bodily expressivity, at least at times, 
serves as material scaffolding extending aspects of another’s subjec-
tivity into social space: the in-betweenness of embodied encounters. 
More radically, the expressive dynamics of our bodily subjectiv-
ity — including various bodily and body-related traits such as ges-
ture, posture, facial and whole-body expressions, and so on — play an 
essential role in driving certain forms of thought and feeling. Mind is 
thus distributed throughout our bodily subjectivity considered as an 
“expressive unity.” And what this means, then, is that, quite often, we 
do have direct perceptual access to the mind of another as it manifests 
within the visuo-spatial dynamics of their bodily expressivity. This 
direct bodily and perceptual access forms the ground of interpersonal 
relatedness.
Watsuji affirms this claim, paying special attention to “the spatial-
ity of human being” to support his view here — and in particular, his 
notion of “subjective spatiality,” which he says is the “essential char-
acteristic of human beings.”38 In chapter nine of Rinrigaku, Watsuji 
observes that culture, which he defines as the effort to collectively 
establish structures for managing the flow of communication and 
information, is characterized by its “spatial extendedness.”39 In other 
words, “all expressions that indicate the interconnection of the acts of 
human beings — for example, intercourse, fellowship, transportation, 
communication — can be understood only with a subjective spatial-
ity of this sort.”40 These structures comprise the “nervous system of 
society.”41 Yet they are not mere things. Rather, they carry human 
intentions and dynamically organize the relationships of those who 
create and use them. They are infused with meaning. And in this 
way, then, they scaffold the material space of intersubjectivity — they 
extend into what we might call the “meaning spaces” of social rela-
tionships — and exhibit a “subjective extendedness.”42
However, this “subjective extendedness” also defines interper-
sonal dynamics on a more immediate face-to-face level. According 
to Watsuji, as we have already noted, the self is hybrid. The self has 
an intrinsically “dual structure” in that it is simultaneously a physi-
cal body as well as an embodied subjectivity. But this hybridity also 
extends to its social existence. For the embodied self, Watsuji argues, 
is additionally both a public as well as a private entity. Its very nature is 
subsequently established in light of this tension and within the shared 
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spaces of social interaction. This idea is clarified with his analysis of 
the Japanese term ningen (人間) and the compound ningen sonzai 
(人間存在). Ningen is a Sino-Japanese compound that translates 
roughly as “human being.”43 But a more nuanced rendering is pos-
sible, Watsuji insists. He notes that ningen already suggests social-
ity and interpersonal relatedness in that the character nin (hito), or 
“person,” implies two individuals supporting one another, while gen 
(or aida) means “betweenness” or “relatedness.”44 Thus, the poles 
of singularity and plurality, private and public, inner and outer, are 
built into the compound ningen, reaffirming the basic hybridity of 
human being. He notes further that human sonzai, or “existence,” 
consists of son (“the self-sustenance of the self”) and zai (“to remain 
within human relations”).45 Human existence (sonzai) is thus “the 
self-sustenance of the self as betweenness.”46 Put otherwise, to be a 
self is to actively negotiate this perpetual tension or “dialectic,” as 
Watsuji refers to it, between individuality and sociality. This negotia-
tion unfolds within the space of betweenness, the space of “subjective 
extendedness.”
To return to social cognition, Watsuji’s conception of the hybrid 
embodied self, as well as the dialectically constituted character of 
ningen sonzai, is the key to his rejection of the internalist premise 
that subjectivity is confined to the head. Approvingly citing Scheler’s 
contention that the spatiality of subjectivity is tied to “the subject’s 
capacity for movement,” Watsuji further insists, given that “ningen 
is fundamentally individualistic and social and that a mere solitary 
person . . . is also an abstraction,” it follows that “the self-movement 
of the subject . . . must be an activity affiliated with human relation-
ships.”47 In its expressive form, the entire body — and not simply the 
brain — is a social organ. And therefore the interactive dynamics of 
embodied encounters — such as gesture, posture, touch, gaze, vocal 
and bodily expression, coordination, activity and passivity, and so 
forth — are carnally based, practical action-connections that estab-
lish the “subjective extendedness” of the social self. Additionally, 
the dynamics of bodily expressivity within social contexts serve as 
the material scaffolding both structuring the lived space of between-
ness (i.e., by making aspects of one’s “inner” subjectivity available for 
direct perception), as well as motivating the back-and-forth dialectic 
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of interpersonal engagement. Watsuji writes, “When I as the subject 
of practice stands face to face with Thou, Thou stands face to face with 
I as the subject of practice. One’s physical body exhibits personal-
ity in every part and, hence, lures another’s personality in its every 
motion. It strengthens opposition through hostility and gives birth 
to unity through affection. It exemplifies what it means ‘to be out-
side’ through coolness and draws toward ‘the inside’ through friend-
liness.48 The animate, expressive (i.e., self-moving), and hybrid body 
is in this way the vehicle by which aspects of subjectivity are spatial-
ity externalized within the betweenness of human relationship. For 
Watsuji continues, “The spatiality of this subject must consist in the 
subjective betweenness of human beings.”49 Therefore, “without tak-
ing into consideration spatial extendedness, we are unable to give a 
satisfactory explanation of the personal relationship between self and 
other.”50 But crucially, Watsuji concludes, this relationality is funda-
mentally a carnal relationality since “bodily connections are always 
visible wherever betweenness prevails.”51 In sum, subjectivity is quite 
literally a distributed, and not merely intracranial, phenomenon, per-
ceptually available within the social space of interpersonal between-
ness. As hybrid (that is, as fundamentally a bodily subjectivity), the 
expressive body’s formal structure ensures this intersubjective acces-
sibility. Before returning to this idea in more detail, I now consider 
Levinas on the embodied nature of intersubjectivity.
III. LEVINAS ON EMBODIED INTERSUBJECTIVITY
My goal in this section is to offer an overview of what I see as 
several crucial features of Levinas’s conception of embodiment and 
intersubjectivity.52 Additionally, as a way of setting up the analysis of 
the next section, I want to highlight several points where Watsuji and 
Levinas are very much in philosophical sympathy.
Throughout several of his most important works, Levinas develops 
a rich phenomenology of the body. And like Watsuji, Levinas empha-
sizes the primacy of our bodily subjectivity in grounding the basic 
structures of our social existence. As is well known, ethical experience, 
according to Levinas, arises from the experience of the “the face” 
(le visage) of another. Though the term “face” in Levinas assumes 
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many connotations in his work, ultimately functioning as a persistent 
metaphor for all aspects of human subjectivity that escape objectifica-
tion, its simplest meaning (and the one I am here concerned with) 
is simply to stand for the encounter with another subject in his or 
her concrete presence. Yet our experience of another’s face is not 
exhausted by an experience of its surface qualities (e.g., the color of 
one’s eyes, the smoothness of one’s forehead, etc.). Rather, the face 
signifies a deeper and more fundamental relationality that manifests 
precisely by the way that the other continually harbors a transcen-
dence or alterity that resists my comprehensive grasp: “The way in 
which the other presents himself, exceeding the idea of the other in me, 
we here name face. This mode does not consist in figuring as a theme 
under my gaze, in spreading itself forth as a set of qualities forming an 
image” (TI 50). So, via the face, the other is immediately present to 
me as a concrete manifestation of another’s subjectivity — but only as 
a presence that at the same time signifies a withdrawal, that is, a pres-
ervation of another’s transcendence or (partial) hiddenness. Levinas 
develops this idea further by introducing two more key terms: “sen-
sibility” and “proximity.”
For Levinas, sensibility is “the subject’s subjectivity . . . its subjec-
tion to everything, its vulnerability” (OB 14). Sensibility is our pri-
mary mode of openness to the world — a transmodal receptivity by 
which we feelingly welcome and receive the world and other subjects. 
In the preface to Totality and Infinity, Levinas describes the book “as 
a defense of [embodied] subjectivity,” and continues, “This book will 
present subjectivity as welcoming the Other, as hospitality; in it the 
idea of infinity is consummated” (TI 26, 27). The lived body is in this 
way “vulnerable” to the impact of otherness (OB 49). The vulnerabil-
ity of our bodily subjectivity is secured by the way that, prior to reflec-
tive or linguistically mediated thought, we are affectively gripped by 
the world and by others. “Sensibility” in Levinas is therefore a prere-
flective or transcendental condition of experience: “Before thinking 
or perceiving objects, the subject is steeped in it [i.e., the world of 
otherness]” (124). In other words, before reasoned thinking, cal-
culation, or inference, we feel ourselves affectively bound up with 
the material reality of otherness — including the ethical demands this 
primitive relation to human otherness places on us. All conceptual or 
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linguistic objectifications of otherness thus arise from within a more 
primitive manifold of bodily affectivity, a “pre-logical subjection” to 
the Other (CPP 135). And the feeling body is in this way the “locus 
and null site” of our experiential encounter with otherness in all its 
variegated forms — including the face of the human other, which pal-
pably strikes our “sensibility on the surface of the skin, at the edge 
of the nerves” (OB 14, 15). We very literally feel the encounter with 
otherness within the depths of our bodily subjectivity.
The notion of “proximity” is offered as the companion concept 
to sensibility. Proximity is Levinas’s attempt to give phenomenologi-
cal articulation to how our bodily encounter with the face of the 
other (i.e., within the structures of “sensibility”) is transfigured from 
an affective resonance into a robust ethical relationality. In spelling 
out the relation between proximity and sensibility, Levinas says, 
“Humanity, to which proximity properly so called refers, must then 
not be first understood as consciousness, that is, as the identity of 
an ego endowed with knowledge” standing over against other self-
contained egos (OB 83). Rather, to be an embodied human subject is 
to always already exist within a felt matrix of connectedness to others. 
But like sensibility, proximity for Levinas is not a cognitive phenom-
enon (i.e., the construction of an ego endowed with knowledge). It 
is related to our prereflective sensibility, and rooted in the origins of 
our bodily subjectivity. Levinas therefore insists, somewhat opaquely, 
“Proximity, which should be the signification of the sensible, does 
not belong to the movement of cognition” (63). Again, what this 
seems to mean is that the original basis of human ethical relationships 
is a felt, interpersonal resonance at the level of the body. More articu-
lated forms of ethical reasoning (e.g., formulating general principles) 
emerge from this fundamental bodily connection.
Levinas continues by insisting that proximity is not “reducible to 
the spatial sense” of the term (OB 82). Here, Levinas moves very close 
to Watsuji’s characterization of the space of social betweenness when 
he insists that human proximity is not equivalent to static geometri-
cal space but that it is, rather, lived space: the dynamic, affect-laden 
phenomenal space that specifies the unique quality of face-to-face 
engagement. For it is within this betweenness that the face of others 
becomes a concrete expression of the simultaneous manifestation and 
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withdrawal of their subjectivity. Within this space I encounter them 
in their embodied alterity, as both vividly present and as partially 
absent. Proximity, as a bodily relationality, is thus “a being caught 
up in fraternity” — and this “fraternity which proximity is we call sig-
nifyingness” (83). According to Levinas, then, proximity specifies 
the experiential character of interpersonal space. In other words, it 
specifies the primitive awareness that we have of ourselves as par-
ticipatory members of a human community, as creatures enmeshed 
with and reliant upon other creatures to whom we have an obligation 
and for whom we are responsible. Therefore, if sensibility, accord-
ing to Levinas, is a transmodal, world-directed openness at the deep-
est levels of our bodily encounter with the world, proximity is the 
blossoming of this bodily subjectivity into a robust intersubjectiv-
ity. Proximity is the uniquely human quality of Levinasian sensibility: 
“Proximity is communication, agreement, understanding, or peace” 
(166). According to Levinas, the fact of our embodiment and social 
situatedness are not neutral features of human reality, but instead, 
are affectively and ethically charged structures that knit us into liv-
ing communities alongside other bodily subjects. We embody ethical 
relations from the very start.
This review of Levinas’s thought provides several suggestive con-
nections with Watsuji’s model of embodied intersubjectivity. First, 
as should be clear, both Watsuji and Levinas stress that sociality is 
fundamentally a bodily phenomenon. This view, as we see in the 
next section, challenges several basic presuppositions of the Theory 
of Mind paradigm in current social cognition research in important 
ways; it also receives support from several lines of empirical research.
Second, like Watsuji, Levinas seems to be urging that, whatever 
else subjectivity is, it is not exclusively an inner thing, property, or 
process. He argues that the conventional tendency to conflate human 
subjectivity with interiority — and then to further assume that these 
terms both refer to some hidden inner realm of experience or cog-
nitive principle of identity — is a mistake. This is because human 
subjectivity — which first emerges from our world-directed “sensi-
bility,” for Levinas — is always cogiven with reference to exteriority. 
Phenomenologically speaking, interiority always arises with exteriority 
as one of its enabling conditions. This is so with bodily  subjectivity, 
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for “I discover my body — mouth and hands, eyes and legs, brain 
and heart — devoted to service.”53 Research on infant mimesis, for 
instance, seems to confirm this idea.54 From the moment they are 
born, infants discover their bodily subjectivity within their explor-
atory “service” to the world itself — the world first apprehended by 
the neonate as an arena for situated action. By experimenting with 
bodily movement and feeling — what Andrew Meltzoff and Keith 
Moore term “bodily babbling” — the neonate simultaneously appre-
hends its nature as both an embodied and situated subjectivity woven 
into a shared world with other bodily subjects. Additionally, neo-
nates emerge from the womb ready to perceive and respond to the 
expressive movements of other human agents by engaging with and 
mimicking facial expressions. Moreover, infants almost immediately 
recognize and respond to communicative intentions. They recognize 
faces as emotionally salient in a way other objects are not, and they 
exhibit an interpersonally sensitive “embodied attending” by initiat-
ing various preparatory movements intended to solicit social inter-
action with caregivers.55 These engagements teach the infant about 
different aspects of its bodily subjectivity, the body considered as a 
social vehicle. Additionally, they affirm the unique experiential and 
expressive status of the face of the other. Therefore, infants imme-
diately feel the affective pull — involving possibilities for service and 
response — within their first encounters with the exteriority of the 
face.56 Developmentally speaking, interiority is cogiven with exterior-
ity; and the body, as both subject and object, mediates this dialectical 
process.
Yet Levinas also, at least at times, seems to have a more radical 
form of externalism in mind, one which aligns him even more closely 
with Watsuji. This is apparent in his discussion of embodied expres-
sion. Recall that, for Watsuji, the physiological body, in virtue of its 
hybrid nature as a bodily subjectivity, is always saturated with expres-
sive significance. This is because the expressive body externalizes 
(some) aspects of subjectivity, thrusting them out into the shared 
spaces of interpersonal betweenness. The physiological body thus 
exhibits a “subjective extendedness,” according to Watsuji; its expres-
sive dynamics serve as material scaffolding, externalizing aspects of 
another’s subjectivity into the common space of the face-to-face 
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encounter. Levinas likewise offers several remarks — characteristically 
cryptic — that, coupled with his insistence on the cogivenness of inte-
riority and exteriority, seemingly indicate a parallel view. For instance, 
he writes, “Exteriority defines the existent as existent, and the signi-
fication of the face is due to an essential coinciding of the existent 
and the signifier. . . . In the face the existent par excellence presents 
itself. And the whole body — a hand or a curve of the  shoulder — can 
express as the face” (TI 262; emphasis added). Elsewhere he insists 
on the “expressivity of the person’s whole sensible being, even in 
the hand one shakes.”57 So, the subjectivity of the other is, accord-
ing to Levinas, concretely present — and thus available for immedi-
ate perception and engagement — within the body’s expressiveness. 
(Though again, the alterity of others ensures that their subjectivity 
is not exhaustively present for me to access; their transcendence is 
preserved.) What I suggest, then, is that Watsuji and Levinas are in 
this way aligned in their rejection of the solipsistic picture accord-
ing to which subjectivity is, necessarily, confined to the head of the 
individual subject. Both thinkers offer an externalist model of sub-
jectivity, that is, one which stresses the constitutive role that bodily 
expression plays in driving certain processes of thinking and feeling, 
and in externalizing these processes within social space. Subjectivity 
is not confined exclusively to the head. Additionally, both reject the 
epistemic consequence of the solipsistic, intracranial view of subjec-
tivity: namely, that the only mind I ever have immediate experiential 
access to is my own and therefore that the minds of others forever 
remain mysterious and wholly inaccessible. Rather, they will insist on 
the second-person availability of subjectivity as externalized by the 
materiality of the body’s expressive form. I now situate these shared 
views of Watsuji and Levinas in the current of contemporary social 
cognition debates and show why both thinkers offer resources for 
challenging, in philosophically significant ways, some of the core pre-
suppositions informing the currently dominant view.
IV. WATSUJI AND LEVINAS ON EXPRESSION AND THE DYNAMICS OF SOCIAL SPACE
Taken together, Watsuji and Levinas provide a balanced correc-
tive to some of the core Cartesian assumptions motivating much 
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current social cognition research. Additionally, their respective views 
counterbalance some of the philosophical excesses of the other. As 
should now be clear, both thinkers argue that our basic sociality is 
established at the level of a felt, bodily connectedness. Moreover, the 
process of social interaction unfolds not within the individual heads 
of subjects separated by an unbridgeable epistemic gulf but rather 
within the expressive dynamics of face-to-face betweenness. Sociality 
is thus fundamentally a bodily, and not an intellectual, phenomenon, 
enacted within the second-person betweenness of concrete human 
relationships.
To see why this is relevant to current debates, consider the Theory 
of Mind paradigm, touched on previously. Again, this framework for 
thinking about the basis of social cognition rests on the core assump-
tion of the “Myth of the Hidden.” For instance, Alan Leslie writes, 
“One of the most important powers of the human mind is to con-
ceive of and think about itself and other minds. Because the mental 
states of others (and indeed ourselves) are completely hidden from the 
senses, they can only ever be inferred.”58 Given this presupposition, 
Theory of Mind casts interpersonal understanding in predominantly 
mentalistic terms; social cognition is thought to be, fundamentally, 
a project of developing the requisite mechanisms to overcome (or at 
least lessen) the epistemic distance between one’s own mind and the 
minds of others. These mechanisms allow one subject to represent 
what is happening in the mind of another, a process of mental state 
attribution by which we are subsequently able to predict and explain 
his or her behavior.
Within current social cognition literature, one finds two proposed 
mechanisms for overcoming this epistemic gulf: the theories proposed 
by Theory Theory (TT) and the simulations advocated by Simulation 
Theory (ST). According to TT, on the one hand, interpreting and 
predicting behavior is the product of innate or acquired theories about 
how minds work, how mental states interrelate, and how mental states 
causally motivate behavior.59 These theories allow us to make infer-
ences about others’ mental lives and to anticipate and interpret their 
behavior based on these inferences. ST, on the other hand, urges 
that this sort of inferential theory-making is unnecessary in virtue of 
the immediate access we have to our own  cognitive and emotional 
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resources. According to ST, we exploit the rich inner resources of our 
own mental life to imaginatively model the mental states of others 
as if we were in their situation, yielding a practical understanding of 
another’s motives and intentions.60 The particulars of the Theory of 
Mind debate are much more subtle than this. However, this quick 
gloss conveys that social understanding is thought to consist in the 
deployment of a theory or simulative model, which is required, once 
more, since minds are localized in the head and given with an exclu-
sive first-person privilege.
It is precisely at this point that both Watsuji and Levinas offer 
their challenge. Again, recall that both insist on the irreducibly hybrid 
nature of the embodied mind. Watsuji, for instance, speaks of the 
“dual structure” of our bodily subjectivity.61 We are, both thinkers 
agree, individual and social, private and public — and we embody these 
poles simultaneously from the moment we are born. This emphasis 
on our subject-object hybridity, and particularly the way this hybrid-
ity is manifest in our expressive encounters with others, is particularly 
relevant since both men furthermore argue that we do have imme-
diate perceptual access to another’s subjectivity in and through the 
material expression of the body. Moreover, both implicitly critique 
knowledge-based models of sociality (e.g., TT and ST) by insisting 
that, as Levinas puts it, “Sociality cannot have the same structure as 
knowledge” (EI 60).
What does this mean, exactly? I here want to turn to several lines 
of empirical research to clarify this claim and to support both Watsuji 
and Levinas on this point. First, consider the claim that sociality can-
not have the same structure as knowledge but that it rests, rather, 
on a more basic form of bodily expressivity and felt intimacy. As the 
neonate mimesis research discussed earlier seemingly indicates, even 
newborn infants — prior to the development of language, other-
directed theories, or the imaginative capacities required for simula-
tive routines — are drawn to the expressive qualities of the human 
form, particularly the face. Moreover, they are motivated to explore 
their own bodies and expressive capacities when they enter into the 
affective ethos of face-to-face imitative encounters. And the types of 
response they exhibit indicate a genuine sociality to these episodes, 
that is, a context-sensitive interpersonal relevance that goes beyond 
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mere  mimicking. As psychologist Vasudevi Reddy observes, “When 
interacting with people, newborn infants don’t just imitate, they 
respond. They respond with interest or disinterest, with attention or 
avoidance, and at least within weeks, with reciprocal rather than imi-
tative actions.”62
In other words, there is a genuine back-and-forth to these encoun-
ters — a “dialectical” structure, to use Watsuji’s favored term — that 
teaches the infant early lessons about his or her hybrid (i.e., private and 
public) self, as well as the emotionally and communicatively significant 
character of face-to-face encounters. For instance, both infants and 
caregivers seem to derive pleasure from these interactions. Increased 
smiles are observed before, during, and after imitative exchanges.63 
Additionally, infants exhibit a greater increase in heart rate (suggest-
ing heightened attentiveness and anticipation) when attempting to 
provoke interactions with adults than they do when simply responding 
to those interactions. This and other evidence indicates that the face-
to-face betweenness of these early encounters is already “swimming 
in emotion,” mediated by the dynamics of bodily expressivity. These 
intimate encounters are “orchestrated via a corporal choir of visual, 
auditory, tactile, and kinetic modalities.”64 Additionally, psycholo-
gist Jaqueline Nadel strikes a suggestively Levinasian chord when she 
observes that imitation acknowledges the alterity of the other, that is, 
by saying to the other being imitated that “I take you as you are.”65
This line of research strongly suggests that there is something 
experientially significant about even the earliest preverbal encounters 
with the face of another person within imitative episodes.66 Within 
mimesis, the encounter with the face of the other specifies the unique 
phenomenal character of interpersonal space, the bodily betweenness 
that Watsuji and Levinas both see as fundamental to understanding 
the basis of human relationships. This is a crucial addition to current 
discussions. The interpersonal mechanisms (e.g., theories, simula-
tions, etc.) posited by the Theory of Mind paradigm offer “how” 
explanations:67 they purport to explain how different sorts of imita-
tion occur (via the formulation of theories or simulative models), 
even though, as we have seen, their “how” story requires that a more 
primitive preverbal level of felt connectedness already be in place. 
Such “how” stories do not explain why imitation occurs, that is, the 
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meaning of this phenomenon. This latter issue is a question about 
motivation: what first motivates this primitive affect-laden response 
to the experienced face of the other?
I suggest that Watsuji’s and Levinas’s phenomenological descrip-
tion can be of assistance here. First, the face is not experienced as 
utterly alien, as an epistemically mysterious object that requires delib-
erate sorting out (contra the Theory of Mind paradigm). Rather, the 
face, in expression, is immediately manifest as a revelation of an alter 
subjectivity, that is, as the simultaneous presence and withdrawal of 
alterity — a phenomenal revelation which subsequently gives inter-
personal space its unique felt character (unlike our spatial encoun-
ter with physical objects). On the one hand, the face is immediately 
experienced as a concrete presentation of another’s subjectivity. For 
within imitation, “the other’s dynamic personal presence, emotions, 
and motivation are directly felt in presentational immediacy.”68 The 
immediacy and enthusiasm with which neonates enter into imitative 
episodes, as well as the context-sensitive nature of their responses, 
seem to indicate this. On the other hand, others are not wholly present 
in the sense that aspects of their subjectivity remain transcendent. As 
Reddy argues at length, the attentive gaze of another person discloses 
the infant to him or herself as an object, namely, an object for another’s 
subjectivity, which partially eludes the infant.69 This primitive experi-
ence of being an object for another subject forms the basis for more 
articulate, and later developing, forms of self-consciousness.
Self-consciousness is thus mediated by the bodily encounter with 
the face of another — interiority co-arises with exteriority, as both 
Watsuji and Levinas insist. Moreover, the face is the primary point 
of contact within imitation. And imitative episodes, oriented toward 
the expressive dynamics of the face, are therefore “an inherently inter-
subjective phenomenon, in which both infant and adult are actively 
engaging in an emotionally endowed, communicative exchange,” all 
before the onset of theoretical or simulative capabilities.70 Configured 
thusly, interpersonal space becomes the phenomenal space of felt 
intimacy.
Watsuji and Levinas also challenge the Theory of Mind paradigm 
in a second, and perhaps, more direct way. Again, as we have seen, 
both argue that the expressive dynamics of the body serve as  material 
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vehicles externalizing some aspects of subjectivity, thus making the 
mind of another (partially) available for perceptual engagement. This 
is a strong claim, one which requires a more careful defense than is 
here possible. But we can unpack this idea somewhat by first not-
ing some of the ways that various bodily and body-related expressive 
traits (postural adjustments, touch, hand movements, facial expres-
sions, whole body movements, interpersonal coordination, and so 
forth) play an essential role in driving some forms of thinking and 
feeling.
As already discussed, neonates come into the world seemingly 
aware of how imitation and expressive movements enable the negoti-
ation of interpersonal space and thus serve as communicative vehicles 
for creating sympathetic attunement and interpersonal intimacy. Of 
course, our gestures become more florid and ubiquitous as we age. 
And they arguably take on an even greater causal role when they 
become part of the material process of thought itself. For example, 
in some instances, it appears that gestures do not merely express 
fully formed thoughts or intentions. Rather, they appear to help us 
think; they play an active, causal role in driving thinking and, at times, 
feeling.71 Susan Goldin-Meadow has conducted many studies and 
surveyed other research indicating that gestures occur nearly every-
where, including within some surprising contexts. For example, we 
gesture when talking on the phone, to ourselves, and in the dark; our 
gestures co-vary with task difficulty; gestures increase when speakers 
must choose between increased options; and we gesture more when 
reasoning about a problem as opposed to describing the problem or 
a known solution.72 This fact alone suggests that gestures have more 
than simply a communicative or supplementary function.
Additionally, Goldin-Meadow and colleagues have designed a 
number of experiments to test the hypothesis that, beyond merely 
serving a communicative function, gesture may play an active causal 
role in learning — for instance, by lightening the speaker’s cognitive 
load (i.e., informational offloading) and freeing up additional cogni-
tive resources for, among other things, memory and recall.73 One 
study found that children and adults asked to explain their strategy 
for solving a math problem while simultaneously remembering a list 
of words or letters did better on the recall portion of the test ( reciting 
53-78_KALMANSON ET AL_F6.indd   73 8/23/2013   7:12:00 PM
© 
20
13
 D
uq
ue
sn
e U
niv
ers
ity
 P
r s
s
74 Joel Krueger
the list) when they were allowed to gesture while explaining their 
problem-solving strategy.74 Gesturing can also promote learning. 
Children who mimic an instructor’s gestures representing a success-
ful strategy for solving mathematical equivalence problems are more 
likely to learn the strategy.75 Gesturing during the learning of a new 
mathematical concept, instead of just speaking about it, appears to 
assist concept retention.76 Early (prior to 14 months) and prodigious 
gesturing, such as pointing, appears to play a central role in later 
vocabulary development.77 Another study found that gestures play 
a central role in the development of scientific theories of molecu-
lar models in biochemistry labs. They do this by providing external, 
relatively stable visuo-spatial dynamics allowing for representational 
formats not sufficiently available in other modalities (e.g., speech, 
imaginative simulation, etc.). This enables the content of the theory 
to be externally reformulated and made more explicit — and thus 
open to further intersubjective scrutiny and collaboration.78 Finally, it 
seems that even the physicality of doodling can play an active cogni-
tive role in the doodler’s ability to focus attention and process, parse, 
and recall information.79
What about emotional and affective processes? Consider Moebius 
Syndrome, a rare nonprogressive congenital condition that usually 
results in complete bilateral facial paralysis. A persistent feature of 
the narratives of individuals with Moebius Syndrome — sensitively 
chronicled in the work of neurophysiologist Jonathan Cole — is that, 
due to their expressive deficit, the phenomenal character of some 
emotions and moods is constricted or diminished. This leads some 
Moebius subjects to report that they have the impression of assuming 
a spectatorial stance in their emotional experiences and social interac-
tions. For instance, James, a priest in his fifties, says that
I have a notion which has stayed with me over much of my life — that 
it is possible to live in your head, entirely in your head. . . . I do think 
I get trapped in my mind or my head. I sort of think happy or I think 
sad, not really saying, or recognizing, actually feeling happy or feeling 
sad. Perhaps I have had a difficulty in recognizing that which I’m put-
ting a name to is not a thought at all but it is a feeling, maybe I have 
to intellectualize mood.80
This spectatorial stance even defined James’s initial experience of fall-
ing in love with his wife: “I was probably thinking [about being in 
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love] initially. It was some time later when I realized that I really felt 
in love.”81
The idea of a reciprocal, causal link between bodily expression and 
the phenomenal character of emotional experience receives robust 
support in a number of empirical studies. James Laird has chronicled 
hundreds of studies investigating the link between feeling and action. 
Laird defends the Jamesian view that “our feelings are the conse-
quences of our actions” and not the other way around.82 The largest 
and most consistent body of evidence in support of this theory con-
cerns facial expressions.83 An overwhelming majority of studies seems 
to indicate that manipulation of expressive behavior produces cor-
responding changes in feelings. For example, multiple studies have 
found that when subjects are induced to adopt a particular emotion-
specific facial expression (for example, grimacing or frowning), they 
report experiencing the corresponding emotion (disgust or anger).84 
Beyond this, Paula Niedenthal surveys further research affirming that 
adopting emotion-specific facial expressions and postures influences 
preferences and attitudes; further, inhibition of bodily expression 
(i.e., motor movements) leads to diminished emotional experience 
(i.e., reduction in the experience’s phenomenal intensity), as well 
as interference in processing emotional information.85 The body’s 
expressive dynamics, therefore, seem to play (at least at times) an 
active role in driving both thinking and feeling.
How does this relate to social cognition? Simply put, the visuo-
spatial dynamics of gesture and bodily expressivity provide real-time 
perceptual access to thinking and feeling in action. In this way, an 
epistemically demanding cognitive-inferential process (e.g., the 
 theory-building and simulative projection advocated by the Theory 
of Mind paradigm) is transformed into a less demanding process of 
direct perception and interactional engagement. The embodied pres-
ence of others reveals aspects of their subjectivity as manifest in their 
concrete presence. And the core internalist supposition informing the 
Theory of Mind paradigm (as well as the philosophical “Problem of 
Other Minds” framework standing behind it) is in this way drawn into 
question. For, while I may not have full epistemic certainty about what 
other people are thinking and feeling at a given moment, I neverthe-
less have phenomenal access to aspects of their subjectivity as they 
are manifest within the interpersonal betweenness that defines our 
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face-to-face interaction. Therefore, “in this way our everyday experi-
ence of others reaches the other subjectivities themselves, without 
divesting them of their alterity.”86 Both Watsuji and Levinas affirm that 
we ought to give explanatory prioritization to the extended human 
form — and not simply the brain — when investigating the basis of 
social understanding. The expressive body as a whole, in relation to 
other expressive bodies, is thus the locus of our sociality. In their own 
ways, both implicitly challenge the philosophically prejudiced picture 
of the “embrained” (as opposed to embodied and embedded) mind 
framing much current discussion.
Finally, Watsuji’s emphasis on the dynamic and interactional 
nature of embodied encounter serves as a corrective to Levinas’s 
more static appraisal of this phenomenon, which is often character-
ized in terms of radical passivity. Conversely, Levinas’s insistence 
that the transcendence of the other is continually preserved within 
our encounter with the face — no matter how revelatory another’s 
presence-in-expression might be — is a useful corrective to Watsuji’s 
tendency to over-emphasize the extent to which everything having to 
do with subjectivity is socially manifest, accessible to the social other. 
Taken together, then, their careful phenomenological descriptions 
of our embodied encounter with the other remain highly relevant to 
ongoing discussions in philosophy and cognitive science.87
V. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Watsuji and Levinas have much to contribute to current social 
cognition debates. They make for productive philosophical partners, 
as they both share several common interests and orientations that 
come together in mutually illuminating ways, which might offer a 
fresh critical perspective to the dominant Theory of Mind paradigm 
informing many social cognition discussions. To truly find a place 
for Watsuji and Levinas in this discussion, much more work clearly 
needs to be done. For, despite his prominence within continental 
philosophical circles — and despite the rapidly growing interest in 
phenomenology from those working outside the tradition (e.g., ana-
lytical philosophers and empirical researches within the various cogni-
tive sciences) — Levinas is rarely mentioned. Part of this surely stems 
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from his difficult style and, at times, almost stubborn obscurity. And 
Watsuji is certainly even less well known, even to those within the 
phenomenological tradition. But both offer rich theoretical resources, 
which make them well suited to participate in ongoing debates. The 
humble aspirations of this essay will therefore have been realized 
if this discussion serves to bring more attention to their potential 
contributions.
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